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Abstract
We study a vertically di¤erentiated market where two rms simultaneously choose the
quality and price of the good they sell and where consumers may also care for the average
quality of the goods supplied. Firms are composed of two factions whose objectives
di¤er: one is maximizing prot while the other maximizes revenues. The equilibrium
concept we model, called Firm Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (FUNE), corresponds to
the Nash equilibrium between rms when there is e¢ cient bargaining between the two
factions inside both rms. We rst show that such equilibria are ine¢ cient, with both
rms underproviding quality. We then assume that the government takes a participation
in one rm, which introduces a third faction, bent on welfare maximization, in that
rm. We study the characteristics of equilibria as a function of the bargaining weight
of the welfare-maximizing faction. We show that equilibrium welfare increases with this
bargaining weight, especially if consumers care a lot for the average quality of the goods
provided.
Key words: mixed oligopoly, privatization, vertical di¤erentiation, factions, party-
unanimity Nash equilibrium.
JEL Classication: D21, D43, D62, H82.
1 Introduction
In many countries, several sectors of activity are characterized by the presence of both
public and private rms. Examples range from network industries (energy, transporta-
tion, telecommunications) to the service sectors (banking, insurance), and from health
care provision to education.1 Since the 1980s, there has been a global movement to-
wards (at least partial) privatization of public rms. In this context, the question of the
optimal degree of government ownership in a rm is a relevant one, particularly so in
Europe where many network industries have recently been opened to more private com-
petition. For instance, there is currently a debate in France about the optimal extent of
privatization of the public utilities Gaz de France and Electricité de France. Examples
abound beyond network industries as well: see the discussions over the optimal extent
of public ownership of rms like Volkswagen or regional savings-and-loans banks in Ger-
many, or of EADS and its subsidiary Airbus. The objective of this paper is to better
understand the determinants of the optimal degree of government ownership in a rm,
taking into account decisions both within and between rms.
The mixed oligopoly literature analyzes equilibria in industries with competition
between a small number of rms whose objectives di¤er. Until recently, most of the
literature has focused on the particular case of a private, prot-maximizing rm com-
peting with a public, welfare-maximizing rm. Recent papers like those of Matsumura
(1998) and White (2002) assume that a rm may be semi-public, in which case it max-
imizes a convex combination of prot and welfare. Matsumura (1998) shows that some
partial privatization is always preferable to both full nationalization and full privatiza-
tion. Likewise, White (2002) shows that the equilibrium welfare in the industry would
be higher if the public rm maximized some convex combination of welfare and prots
rather than welfare alone. White (2002) does not study how, in his words, to manipu-
late the public rms objective function, but this could be done by partially privatizing
the rm.2
1Parris, Pestieau and Saynor (1987) contains a quantitative description of the importance of public
rms in Western Europe.
2This analysis is reminiscent of the literature on strategic delegation by rms owners. Fershtman
and Judd (1987) study the principal agent problem between prot maximizing owners and managers
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These results are driven by the strategic interactions between rms. We think it
is important also to take into account the internal functioning of the rms. Seabright
(2004) contends that Firms in America or Western Europe are coalitions, products
of the eighteenth century political theory of checks and balances that underlies the
American Constitution. (p.172). In the context of mixed oligopolies, the main focus
has been on the conict between workers and managers/owners. Willner (1999) starts
from the observation that, while cost e¢ ciency is often invoked as a reason to privatize,
empirical ndings do not give unanimous support to the claim that public rms are
less cost e¢ cient than private rms. He studies a mixed duopoly in which wages are
determined by bargaining in a rst stage before the two rms compete à la Cournot.
He assumes exogenous and identical bargaining weights for the two rms (irrespective
of their objectives) and compares the equilibrium allocations when both rms maximize
prot and when one instead maximizes welfare. He obtains that nationalization of one
rm is benecial despite making this rm appear less cost e¢ cient. Unfortunately, he
does not say anything about partial government ownership of a rm. Jiang (2006)
introduces partial privatization in a sequential model where the government decides
rst on the optimal degree of privatization of the public rm, then negotiates the wage
rate with a union, and where nally the two rms choose their quantity levels (either
simultaneously a la Cournot or sequentially). As in Matsumara (2002), the extent of
government ownership determines the weight put on social welfare (as opposed to own
prot) in the semi-public rms objective. The main result of the paper is to show that
the optimal privatization degree depends on the bargaining weight of the union (which
is exogenously xed).
The papers by Willner (1999) and Jiang (2006) represent important steps since they
move away from the depiction of rms as unitary actors in a mixed oligopoly context. On
the other hand, observe that internal bargaining does not a¤ect the objective function
of the rms, but rather the costs of the rm. Our approach goes one step further
and endogenizes the rms objective as a function of the bargaining weights of the
in a classical oligopolistic context and show that the optimal contract distorts the managers incentives
away from maximizing prots.
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di¤erent factions that make up the rm. Moreover, we endogenize the bargaining weights
themselves.
We assume that rms are composed of (at least) two factions. One faction represents
the interest of the owners, who want to maximize prot. The other faction is composed
of managers, whose interests are not perfectly aligned with the owners. We assume
that managers maximize revenue,3 and one can think of several reasons why this may
be so, like ego-rents, career concerns (heading the largest rm in an industry means
being highly visible), empire building temptations, etc. Like Willner (1999) and
Jiang (2006), we do not model the principal-agent relationship between owners and
managers, but rather assume that decisions within a rm are taken through some form
of bargaining between prot-motivated and revenue-motivated agents. As a rst step,
we are agnostic as to the particular form this bargaining takes, and we only assume
that bargaining is e¢ cient (i.e., it results in an allocation on the Pareto frontier for the
two factions inside the rm, given the decision taken by other rms in the industry). A
Firm Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (or FUNE) is then a Nash equilibrium between rms
coupled with unanimity between factions inside rms  i.e., a vector of rmsactions
such that no other action would simultaneously increase both prot and revenue for any
rm, given the actions taken by the other rms.
A laudable feature of this equilibrium concept is that equilibria in pure strategies
typically exist even when the strategy space is multidimensional, which is usually not the
case if the rms have a single goal (e.g., prot maximization). FUNE thus complexies
the conception of what happens inside a rm, in exchange for an intellectually satisfying
simplicity in the nature of inter-rm competition.
We apply this novel equilibrium concept4 to the following setting. We assume that
two rms o¤er a vertically di¤erentiated good and that they simultaneously choose the
quality and price of the good they o¤er. We assume that customers care about the
characteristics (quality and price) of the good they buy, and that they may also care
3This assumption dates back at least to Baumol (1958).
4FUNE is an adaptation of the concept of party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE), proposed
by one of us in the study of political competition (Roemer (1999, 2001)). There, political parties are
composed of factions with di¤erent goals.
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about the average quality of the goods consumed.
There are two main reasons to use a vertical di¤erentiation setting. First, it is a
classical example where simultaneous Nash equilibria in pure strategies typically do
not exist, so that researchers have modeled the game as sequential. Such a setting,
then, illustrates the mathematical payo¤ to using the FUNE equilibrium concept. Sec-
ond, vertical di¤erentiation is a good depiction of many mixed oligopoly sectors: since
the original contribution by Grilo (1994), this type of model has been applied, for in-
stance, to public transportation (Cantos-Sanchez and Moner-Colonques(2006)), health
care (Pita-Barros and Martinez-Giralt(2000)) and higher education (Romero and Del
Rey (2004)). Finally, we have added the possibility that consumers may care about
the average quality produced because it ts well two of the examples we have given at
the start of the paper. In the automobile industry, people care about the average fuel
mileage of cars because of pollution concerns. In the energy sector, the same pollution
concerns drive some people to pay more for so-called green energy: quality is here
understood as the carbon content of the energy consumed. Consumers may also be
concerned with the dangers inherent in the production process: many consumers, for
example, are ready to pay more for electricity that is not nuclear in origin. In all these
cases, the individual decision as to which good to buy exerts a consumption external-
ity on other individuals. In any case, most of the results we obtain hold true when
consumers do not care for quality. Introducing such a concern allows us to test the
robustness of our results along this dimension.
We start by computing the FUNEs in our setting. There is a two-dimensional mani-
fold of FUNEs, which can be characterized according to the relative bargaining weights
of the revenue-maximizing factions in the two rms. We analyze the welfare properties
of these equilibria and nd that they fall short of optimality. This is not surprising
because two assumptions of the fundamental welfare theorems are not satised: perfect
competition and complete markets. Even in the absence of consumption externality, it
is well known that oligopolies do not provide the optimal quality mix see Crampes
and Hollander (1995) for instance.
We then add more structure to the intra-rm bargaining by providing an explanation
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of how the bargaining weights will be determined at equilibrium. We assume that avail-
able managers di¤er in quality, and that higher-quality managers are attracted by rms
generating larger revenues. The quality of the managers a¤ects the bargaining weight of
the revenue-maximizing faction, and thus the equilibrium revenues and prots obtained
by both rms. We nd the unique xed point of this game, where the quality of the
managers attracted in both rms is compatible with the revenues obtained at equilib-
rium, and where these revenues correspond to the (unique) FUNE with the bargaining
weights implied by the managersquality. We focus upon this FUNE, characterized by
the relative bargaining weights between revenue and prot-maximizing factions in both
rms, in the rest of the paper.
The public intervention we study consists in the governments taking a participation
in one rm. Since it owns part of the rm, the government is entitled to designate a
fraction of the directors on the board. We model this as the introduction of a third fac-
tion in this rm, with welfare maximization as its objective. To understand the impact
of various levels of government intervention, we keep the relative bargaining weights be-
tween prot- and revenue-maximizing factions constant in both rms and assume that
the bargaining weight of the welfare-maximizing faction increases with (or is a proxy
for) the extent of governments participation.5 A single FUNE corresponds to each vec-
tor of bargaining weights, and we study the normative properties of these equilibria as
a function of the extent of the governments intervention in the rm. Finally, we study
how these normative properties are modied when the intensity of the consumption
externality is varied, and when the identity of the rm in which the government invests
is modied.
Our main results are as follows. First, in the absence of government intervention,
the quality levels provided by both rms are too low, even when there is no consumption
externality. Moreover, too many people consume the high quality good. The e¢ ciency of
the FUNEs (measured as the total welfare generated by any FUNE allocation compared
5As pointed out by a referee, a rm may represent a coalition between conicting interests even under
full state-ownership, with prots, total revenues or welfare as objectives. Since our analysis in terms of
the bargaining weights of the factions constituting a rm, our paper is relevant even in the absence of
a positive relationship between state ownership and bargaining weight of welfare-maximizers.
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to the maximum welfare attainable) varies from roughly 50% to 70%. Second, total
welfare increases monotonically with the welfare maximizers bargaining weight, but
the marginal gain in welfare tends towards zero as the bargaining weight becomes large.
Third, governments intervention is especially attractive when consumers care a lot for
the average quality of the good provided, as both the marginal and absolute e¢ ciency
gains from governments intervention are larger. We obtain the same qualitative features
whether the government invests in the high-quality or the low-quality rm.
2 The model
There is a continuum of consumers, indexed by , distributed according to the distribu-
tion function F on [0,m], with density denoted by f . We denote by  the average value
of  and by med its median value. Each consumer buys one unit of a good of quality
q, and has a utility function
V (q; p; q;) = q + q   p (1)
where q is the average quality consumed and p the price. The second term denotes the
environmental externality: each individuals utility increases with the average quality
of the goods consumed (for instance, the average pollution or fuel mileage of cars). We
assume for simplicity that all individuals share the same  2 [0; 1]  i.e., that they have
the same relative valuation for average quality (although absolute variation  varies
across individuals).
There are two rms (indexed by subscript i = 1; 2), each providing one good. They
share the same cost function, which is linear in quantity and convex in quality:6 c(q)
denotes the per unit (of quantity) cost of providing a good of quality q. We assume
without loss of generality that q1 > q2 and we call rm 1 the high quality rm.
When choosing from which rm to buy, individuals do not consider their (innitesi-
mal) impact on the average quality of the good consumed. Individual  then buys from
rm 1 if
q1   p1 > q2   p2
6This is the formulaton used, among others, by Crampes and Hollander (1995).
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i.e., if
 >
p1   p2
q1   q2 = 
(p1; q1; p2; q2): (2)
We then obtain that7
q =
Z
0
q2f()d+
mZ

q1f()d:
In each rm, two factions coexist, one maximizing prot while the other maximizes
revenue. Prot in rm i = 1; 2 is given by
1(p1; q1; p2; q2) = [p1   c(q1)] (1  F ()) ;
2(p1; q1; p2; q2) = [p2   c(q2)]F ();
while revenue is given by
R1(p1; q1; p2; q2) = p1 (1  F ()) ;
R2(p1; q1; p2; q2) = p2F (
):
Observe that the externality intensity  impacts neither prot nor revenue, since it does
not impact individual demand.
We now introduce our equilibrium concept.
Denition 1 A Firm Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (FUNE) is a vector (p1; q1; p2; q2)
such that
(i) @(p01; q01) such that 1(p01; q01; p2; q2)  1(p1; q1; p2; q2) and
R1(p
0
1; q
0
1; p2; q2)  R1(p1; q1; p2; q2) with at least one strict inequality, and
(ii) @(p02; q02) such that 2(p1; q1; p02; q02)  2(p1; q1; p2; q2)
and R2(p1; q1; p02; q02)  R2(p1; q1; p2; q2) with at least one strict inequality.
In words, no rm can nd another pair of price and quality that would strictly
increase one of its factionsobjectives (revenue or prot) without decreasing its other
factions objective.
It will prove easier in the paper to use a slightly di¤erent denition of FUNEs. We
introduce the following assumption.
7The upperbound m is assumed to be large enough so that some people buy the high quality good.
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Assumption 1 log(1(p; q; p2; q2)); log(R1(p; q; p2; q2)); log(2(p1; q1; p; q))
and log(R2(p1; q1; p; q)) are concave in (p; q).
Roemer (2001, Theorem 8.2.) proves that, if Assumption 1 holds, then any FUNE
is also a weighted Nash bargaining solution. We assume from now on that Assumption
1 holds and we make use of the following denition:
Denition 2 A FUNE is a vector (p1; q1; p2; q2) and a pair (a1; a2) 2 [0; 1]2 such that
(i) given (p1; q1), (p2; q2) = argmax
 
2(p1; q1; p2; q2) 2
a2  R2(p1; q1; p2; q2) R21 a2 ;
and
(ii) given (p2; q2), (p1; q1) = argmax
 
1(p1; q1; p2; q2) 1
a1  R1(p1; q1; p2; q2) R11 a1 ;
where i and Ri represent, respectively, the impasse utility of the prot-maximizing and
of the revenue-maximizing factions in case no agreement is found between factions inside
rm i, i = 1; 2.
We assume that, in the absence of agreement between factions inside rm i, this
rm does not produce, so that the impasse utilities (prot or revenue) of its factions are
zero: i = 0; Ri = 0: The rst order conditions for rm 1 at a FUNE are8
a1
1
r11 + 1  a1
R1
r1R1 = 0; (3)
where
r11 =

@1
@p1
;
@1
@q1

and r1R1 =

@R1
@p1
;
@R1
@q1

: (4)
These rst order conditions can be expanded to obtain
1  a1
a1
=
R1
1
1  F ()  [p1   c(q1)] f()@@p1
F ()  1 + p1f()@@p1
; (5)
1  a1
a1
=
R1
1
 c0(q1) (1  F ())  [p1   c(q1)] f()@@q1
p1f(
)@

@q1
; (6)
with
@
@p1
=
1
q1   q2 > 0
@
@q1
=   p1   p2
(q1   q2)2
< 0:
8 In order to save on notation, we do not report the arguments for the prot and revenue functions
from now on.
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The rst order conditions for rm 2 are obtained similarly. Observe that the exter-
nality intensity  does not a¤ect the rst order conditions at a FUNE.
We now look at the Pareto e¢ cient allocations in order to compare them with FUNE
allocations. Pareto allocations are dened by the triple (q1, q2, ~). It is easy to see that
the high quality good is supplied to all  > ~ and the low quality good to all  < ~.
This is done with a simple switchingargument: if 1 > 2 but 1 consumes the low
quality good while 2 consumes the high quality good, then a trade with side payment
can be arranged making both better o¤.
The usual argument from quasi-linearity shows that Pareto e¢ ciency requires max-
imization of the sum of consumer surplus and rmsprots
W =
~Z
0
q2dF () +
mZ
~
q1dF () + q   c(q1)(1  F (~))  c(q2)F (~) (7)
where q = q2F (~)+q1(1 F (~)): A Pareto optimal allocation (q1, q2, ~) that maximizes
W solves the following rst order conditions:
@W
@~
= f(~)
h
~+ 

(q2   q1)  (c(q2)  c(q1))
i
= 0; (8)
@W
@q1
=
mZ
~
dF () + (1  F (~))  (1  F (~))c0(q1) = 0; (9)
@W
@q2
=
~Z
0
dF () + F (~)  F (~)c0(q2) = 0: (10)
We start by examining separately the optimality formulas for the allocation of consumers
across goods and for qualities. Equation (8) gives
~ =
c(q1)  c(q2)
q1   q2   
: (11)
This result is very intuitive: for given quality levels, a large concern for pollution
(larger ) induces provision of the high quality good to more people. Comparing with
the individual decision rule (2), we immediately see that marginal cost pricing will not
drive the optimal allocation of goods across customers (for given quality levels), but
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that too many consumers will buy the low quality good because they do not take into
account the externality associated with their choice.
We will see in a short while how this result is modied when quality levels are set at
their optimal level at the same time as the value of . As for qualities, putting together
(9) and (10), we obtain
(1 + ) = F (~)c0(q2) + (1  F (~))c0(q1); (12)
namely that optimal qualities equalize average preferences for quality (including the
pollution aspect) and average marginal cost of quality.
We now look at the simultaneous determination of  and of qualities. From now on,
we assume a quadratic cost of quality (which corresponds to the formulation used for
the simulations studied later on in the paper): c(q) = q2=2.
Using (12) together with (11) gives
~ = + (
q2 + q1
2
  q):
We then obtain that ~ =  if and only if  = med: Moreover, with a positively skewed
distribution, we have either ~ >  or ~ < med  i.e., the only conguration excluded
is med < ~ < :
Finally, observe from (9) and (10) that
q2 + q1 =
1

2666642+
mR
~
dF ()
1  F (~) +
~R
0
dF ()
F (~)
377775
so that by (11)
~ =
1
2
266664
mR
~
dF ()
1  F (~) +
~R
0
dF ()
F (~)
377775 (13)
which does not depend either on  nor on ! In words, the Pareto e¢ cient allocation
of consumers across goods does not depend on the intensity of the externality when
qualities are set at their optimal level. Moreover, we also have that the optimal di¤erence
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between quality levels, q1  q2; is independent of  (since both q1 and q2 increase by the
same amount with ) but decreases with .
We now turn to the allocation of goods across customers in FUNEs.
Proposition 1 Let c(q) = qr and r  1. Let ^ be the solution of the equation
r   1
r
^ =
1  2F (^)
f(^)
:
Then, in all FUNEs, (p1; q1; p2; q2) = ^.
Proof: See Appendix
A few comments are in order. First, the proportion of people buying the low quality
good is smaller than one half in all FUNEs where r > 1.9 Second, this proportion is
decreasing in r as long as the density f() does not decrease too fast with . A su¢ cient
condition for ^ to be decreasing in r is that the hazard rate function f()=(1   F ())
is non decreasing in . This assumption is satised for a large number of distributions,
starting with the uniform one (for which the fraction of the population who purchase
the low quality good at any FUNE approaches one-third of the population in the limit
as r becomes large). The intuition for this result is that, as the cost of providing quality
becomes more convex, the quality gap between the two goods decreases and more people
buy the high quality good (provided that the density of people does not decrease too fast
as the valuation for quality increases). Finally, comparing equation (13) and Proposition
1, we see that the goodsallocation in FUNEs is generically not optimal when r = 2.
We now turn to numerical simulations in order to shed more light on the FUNE
allocations and on their normative properties.
9 If r = 1, then exactly one-half of the population purchases the high (low) quality good at any
FUNE.
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3 FUNEs without government intervention
We study numerically10 FUNEs with a lognormal distribution of  such that =40
and med=30 while c(q) = q2=3: We obtain a bidimensional manifold of FUNEs. This
manifold is depicted in the (price, quality) space on Figure 1. Figure 1 depicts 3800
FUNEs which have been sorted by increasing order of the high quality price. Each
FUNE vector (p1; q1; p2; q2) is plotted with the same color, that goes smoothly from
blue for the lowest values of p1 to red for its highest values. The ordered pairs (pi; qi) on
the diagonal of the price-quality plane are associated with the high quality rm 1, and
the ones on the semi-circle are associated with the low quality rm 2. There are FUNEs
where the two rms play strategies that are close to one another (the blue FUNEs) and
ones where they play strategies that are very di¤erent (the red end of the spectrum).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Obviously, the low quality rm charges a lower price than the high quality rm (if
it were not the case, it would not have any demand for its product). For all FUNEs,
we have that, in both rms, the prot-maximizing faction wishes to increase price and
decrease quality, while the revenue-maximizing faction wishes to do exactly the opposite.
Indeed, as can be shown from the rst order conditions (3), in each rm the prot-
maximizing faction would like to go in the exact opposite direction (in the (quality,
price) space) to the one favored by the revenue-maximizing faction (i.e, gradients point
into opposite directions). Also, we always observe, in all FUNEs, that the gradient
of the prot-maximizers is steeper in the (p; q) plane for rm 1 than for rm 2 i.e.,
although the general direction towards prot-maximization is the same for both rms
(gradient pointing towards the south-east for all points in Figure 1), the mix of decrease
in quality and increase in price is not the same, with smaller cuts in quality (relative to
increases in price) in the low quality rm 2 than in the other rm.
The main regularities obtained (in all FUNEs) are as follows:
10Finding FUNEs requires solving 4 equations (rst order conditions (5) and (6) for rm 1, and similar
equations for rm 2) in 6 unknowns (p1; q1; p2; q2; a1 and a2): We randomly draw a very large number
of pairs (a1, a2) and attempt to solve for the other 4 unknowns. We also check that the second order
conditions are satised.
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 Prot is lower in rm 1 (the rm producing the high quality good) than in rm 2.
 Revenue is larger in rm 1 than in rm 2.
 The relative bargaining power of the revenue-maximizers, i = (1  ai) =ai, is
higher in rm 1 than in rm 2: 1 > 2: Moreover, in all FUNEs, 1 > 1  i.e.,
the revenue-maximizers have more bargaining power than the prot-maximizers
in rm 1 in all FUNEs.
The next Result summarizes the descriptive characteristics of the FUNEs:
Result 1 In all FUNEs, prot is lower and revenue is larger in the high quality rm,
while the relative bargaining weight of the revenue maximizers is larger in that rm than
in the low quality rm.
We now turn to the normative properties of the FUNEs. We obtain the following
regularities:
 The qualities o¤ered by both rms at equilibrium are lower than the optimal
qualities, whatever the value of . The high quality good is especially decient
(its value varies from 38 to 66 in FUNEs while its optimal values goes from 160
for =0 to 220 for =1; the low quality level varies from 35.7 to 42.5 in FUNEs
while its optimal value goes from 43.6 for =0 to 103.6 for =1).
 Proposition 1 has shown that the equilibrium market share (in volume) F () is
the same in all FUNEs and is not a¤ected by the value of . We also know that
the optimal market share is not a¤ected by  either. Comparing both, we obtain
that too many people consume the high quality good in all FUNEs, compared to
the global optimum: 62.5% vs 14.2%.
 The average quality of goods sold in all FUNEs is lower than the optimal average
quality, whatever the intensity of the externality: the rst e¤ect mentioned above
(both qualities are too low) is larger than the second one (too many people buying
the high quality good).
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We summarize the normative properties of the FUNEs in the following Result:
Result 2 In all FUNEs, and whatever the value of the externality intensity , the
qualities o¤ered by both rms as well as the average quality provided are lower than
optimal, while too many people consume the high quality good.
We already mentioned in section 2 that modifying the value of  does not impact the
FUNEs, since  does not appear in the rst order conditions (5) and (6). The value of
 does not a¤ect the optimal share of people consuming either good, as shown in (13).
On the other hand, raising  increases the value of the optimal qualities of both rms,
as is intuitive and can be shown from equations (9) and (10). As  increases from 0 to
1, we then have that, for any given FUNE, the same people buy from the same rm but
that the quality of the good they buy becomes more and more sub-optimal. In terms of
welfare, observe from (1) that total consumer surplus increases mechanically with  (for
any given FUNE) while prot (the other component of welfare) is not a¤ected by . At
the same time, the maximum aggregate welfare (corresponding to the Pareto optimal
allocation) also increases with . We are interested in the e¢ ciency of FUNEs, obtained
by dividing total welfare at equilibrium by the maximum welfare attainable. With both
the denominator and the numerator increasing with , the comparative statics of this
e¢ ciency measure is a priori ambiguous. Table 1 summarizes the numerical results we
obtain.
Table 1: E¢ ciency of FUNEs as a function of .
E¢ ciency: minimum maximum average
 = 1 47.9% 70.8% 55.8%
 = 0:5 55.5% 76.7% 63.3%
 = 0:25 58.7% 76% 65.8%
 = 0 59.6% 68.8% 64.8%
The second column in Table 1 gives the minimum e¢ ciency attained over the set
of FUNEs, the third column the maximum e¢ ciency and the last column the average
e¢ ciency across FUNEs, assuming that they are all equiprobable. We obtain that FU-
NEs are far from optimal even in absence of externalities ( = 0). While the minimum
e¢ ciency is monotonically decreasing with the intensity of the externality, it is not the
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case for the maximum as well as the average e¢ ciency. Clearly, the average e¢ ciency
depends on the assumption that all FUNEs are equiprobable, which is a very crude one.
For instance, Roemer et al. (2005), which uses a solution concept similar to FUNEs but
applied to political competition, computes a kernel density function of the bargaining
powers (which are the unknown parameters in our problem) to control for the fact that
some regions of bargaining-power-space may occur much more frequently than others.
We have checked the robustness of these regularities to two types of variations:
changes in the distribution function f() and in the cost function c(q). As for the
distribution function, we have performed simulations with lognormal distributions with,
on one hand, larger values of the average  but the same median  (which corresponds
to increasing the positive skewness of the distribution) and with, on the other hand, the
same  but a larger value of med (which corresponds to more symmetrical distributions,
while keeping med  ). As for the cost function, we have kept the functional form
c(q) = qr=2 and we have assessed the impact of varying the value of  while keeping
r = 2, as well as the impact of varying r while keeping  = 2=3: In all cases we have
studied, the set of FUNEs has the same appearance as in Figure 1 (although the precise
location of equilibrium points of course changes) and the regularities reported in Results
1 and 2 hold true in all cases. Also, the e¢ ciency of all FUNEs remains quite low as
in Table 1. For instance, the highest e¢ ciency we obtain across all FUNEs and all
simulations corresponds to 77.8% with  = 1 and a lower value of  than the one
studied extensively above.
We are thus reasonably condent that the regularities reported above are robust to
variations in both the cost function and the distribution function. The next step in
our analysis consists in selecting one FUNE by endogeneizing the factionsbargaining
weights inside both rms.
4 Endogenous bargaining weights
Up to now, we have not provided any explanation as to why intra-rms bargaining
powers are what they are at equilibrium. In other words, any pair of bargaining powers
consistent with Denition 2 constitutes, together with the associated vector of prices
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and qualities, a FUNE. This is the reason why we obtain a two-dimensional manifold
of FUNEs. In this section, we open the bargaining powersblack boxand provide an
explanation as to how their value is determined. Providing such an explanation has an
obvious interest by itself. Moreover, it will allow us to narrow down the set of equilibria
and indeed to obtain unicity.
We assume that there is a pool of available managers, and that these managers di¤er
in some attribute that we call for the moment quality. The average quality of this
pool is denoted by . One half of the managers ends up working in each of the two
rms, so if we denote the average quality level of the managers in rm i by i, we obtain
that
1
2
+
2
2
= :
Managers are attracted by rms generating a higher revenue level, for the reasons in-
dicated in the introduction (ego rents, etc.). Since managers have to choose between
two rms, the average quality of the managers attracted in rm i will be an increasing
function of the revenue share (or market share in value) ri = Ri=(R1+R2) of this rm.
This relationship, which is like a supply function for managerial quality, is summarized
by the following increasing function
Q(ri) = i; i = 1; 2;
with Q(r1) +Q(r2) = 2. It should be plain that Q(0:5) =  and that the steeper the
slope of Q, the more mobile the managers.
We need to dene what di¤erence the managersquality makes in each rm. We
assume that managersquality a¤ects the relative bargaining weights of the two factions
in each rm. Now, we have that, in all FUNEs, revenue is higher in the rm where
the relative bargaining power of the revenue-maximizers is larger than in the other
rm. We make the assumption that the relative bargaining weight of the revenue-
maximizing faction is increasing in the average quality of the managers in that rm.
In that sense, one could talk of managers cleverness or e¢ ciency, rather than quality,
with cleverer/more e¢ cient managers better able to play the boardroom games in order
to reinforce their bargaining power as revenue maximizers. Formally, we assume that
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the relative bargaining weight of the revenue-maximizers is increasing in the managers
quality and represented by the function a(i):
A FUNE with endogenous bargaining weights (eFUNE) is then a FUNE with the
additional requirements that (i) the relative bargaining weight of the revenue-maximizers
in each rm is obtained from the average quality of the managers in this rm and (ii)
the average quality of the managers in each rm is a function of the equilibrium revenue
shares of the rms. Formally,
Denition 3 A FUNE with endogenous bargaining weight (eFUNE) is a vector (p1; q1; p2; q2),
a pair (a1; a2) 2 [0; 1]2 and an assignment of managers of quality i to rm i such that
(i) given (p1; q1), (p2; q2) = argmax
 
2  2
a2  R2  R21 a2 ;
(ii) given (p2; q2), (p1; q1) = argmax
 
1  1
a1  R1  R11 a1 ;
(iii) Q( RiR1+R2 ) = i; i = 1; 2;
(iv) ai = a(i); i = 1; 2:
Generally, there will be locally unique such equilibria, if they exist at all. The
unicity argument can be seen from looking at the following mapping: starting from an
allocation of managers (1,2), the function a(i) gives the relative bargaining weight
in each rm, from which we obtain the corresponding FUNE (which satises equations
(i) and (ii) in the above denition). We then obtain the revenue share of both rms,
which in turn allows us to compute the equilibrium average qualities of managers in
both rms via the equation Q(ri). We are looking for a xed point of this mapping.
The existence problem comes from the fact that there may exist pairs (1,2) for which
no FUNE exists.
We use the following functional forms in our simulations:  = 1, Q(ri) = 2ri and
a(i) = 1=(1 + 5
3
i ), so that the relative bargaining weight of the revenue-maximizers
in rm i is given by (i) = 5
3
i . We obtain a unique eFUNE, with p1=804, q1=48.4,
p2=617, q2=40.5, 1 = 14:5, R1 = 503, 2 =26.8, R2=231.5, r1=68.5%, 1=12.85 and
2=1.25. Note that the equilibrium eFUNE qualities are close to the average qualities
obtained in all FUNEs assuming that they are all equi-probable (which are 46 for rm
1 and 42.5 for rm 2).
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We keep this particular eFUNE, which we denote by eFUNE0, as the starting point
for the rest of the paper. As we want to test the robustness of the results obtained in
the following sections, we also consider two variations. In the rst variation, we keep
the function linking  to  unchanged ((i) = 5
3
i ) but we increase the mobility of
managers across rms by making the function Q(r) steeper around r = 1=2. Intuitively,
increasing the sensitivity of managers to the revenue share should make rm 1 more
attractive to them (since r1 > 1=2), resulting in an increase in r1 at equilibrium. This
is what we obtain in the unique eFUNE (which we denote by eFUNEvar1) arising from
the new formulation11, with r1 increasing from 68.5% (in eFUNE0) to 69.9%. The other
variables associated to eFUNEvar1 are p1=971, q1=53, p2=694, q2=41.3, 1 = 20:8,
R1 = 607, 2 =47.2, R2=260.3, 1=14.6 and 2=0.93.
In the second variation we consider, we keep the Q(:) function as above (Q(r) = 2r)
but we decrease the convexity of the relationship between relative bargaining weight of
managers and their quality by using (i) = 5
2
i : Intuitively, such a modication should
decrease r1, since it decreases the relative bargaining power of revenue-maximizers in
rm 1 (where 1 >  = 1 since r1 > 1=2). This is what we obtain in the unique eFUNE
(which we denote by eFUNEvar2) based on the new formulation, with r1 decreasing from
68.5% (in eFUNE0) to 65.1%. The other characteristics of eFUNEvar1 are that p1=547,
q1=40.2, p2=488, q2=37.7, 1 = 5:25, R1 = 342, 2 =5.4, R2=183.1, r1=65.1%, 1=8.9
and 2=2.26.
5 Government intervention in the high quality rm
From now on, we study the impact of public intervention into this industry. Public in-
tervention is justied by the unappealing normative properties of FUNEs (see section 3
and especially Table 1), and could take several forms. We focus on one public interven-
tion, namely the governments taking a participation in the high-quality rm.12 Taking
11We use Q(r) = 2r if r  1=2 and Q(r) = 2  2(1  r) if r > 1=2, with  = 1:1:
12We assume that there is no government expenditures associated to taking a participation in the
rm. We could easily introduce such expenditures by assuming that the government buys shares on
the market. The price of these shares would then be related to the prot level attained by that rm
before government intervention  i.e., at the eFUNE obtained in the previous section. Note that such
expenditures (which constitute a transfer between government and the rms private owners) would not
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a participation in a rm allows the government to appoint a fraction of the managers
(or directors) of that rm. In our setting, this means that government intervention
introduces a third faction into rm 1. We assume a benevolent government, so that
the third faction maximizes total welfare W in the economy,13 as given by equation (7).
The three factions bargain with each other when deciding about the price and quality of
the good o¤ered by rm 1. As previously, each faction is characterized by a bargaining
weight inside the rm.
Formally, we have that
Denition 4 A FUNE with government intervention in rm 1 (FUNE-G1) is a vector
(p1; q1; p2; q2), a triple (a1; b1; a2) 2 [0; 1]3 with (a1; b1; a1 + b1; a2) 2 [0; 1]4 such that
(i) given (p1; q1), (p2; q2) = argmax
 
2  2
a2  R2  R21 a2 ;
(ii) given (p2; q2), (p1; q1) = argmax
 
1  1
a1  R1  R11 a1 b1 (W  W )b1 where
W is given by equation (7).
The impasse utilities of the factions in rm i are given by the value of their objective
function in case there is no agreement inside rm i, in which case we suppose that the
rm is not active on the market. For prot-maximizing and revenue-maximizing rms,
the impasse utilities are zero: i = 0; Ri = 0; i 2 f1; 2g: For the welfare-maximizing
faction in rm 1, the impasse utility is the welfare level when only rm 2 produces. In
that case, everyone buys good 2 and the aggregate welfare level is given by
W = q2(1 + )  c(q2):
Observe that the impasse utility of welfare-maximizers is a function of the quality pro-
duced by rm 2, but not of its price (since we assume that everyones valuation of the
good is high enough that everyone buys from rm 2).
Our objective is to study the impact on the industry equilibrium of the government
taking a participation in the high quality rm. To do so, we need to relate the extent
a¤ect our normative analysis as long as we maximize unweighted surplus. Introducing an exogenous
cost of public funds would of course make such expenditures less appealing.
13For instance, the directors that represent the government in the Board are told to maximize this
objective.
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of the public participation in rm 1 to the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizing
faction, b1. We assume a monotone increasing relationship, so that we can concentrate
on the bargaining weight of this faction.
Our benchmark situation is the eFUNE without government intervention obtained
in the previous section and denoted by eFUNE0. To concentrate on the impact of gov-
ernment intervention, we keep the relative bargaining weight of the prot- and revenue-
maximizing factions constant in both rms as we increase the bargaining weight of the
welfare-maximizers in rm 1. That is, we keep both (1   a2)=a2 and (1   a1   b1)=a1
constant at the level reached in this unique eFUNE (resp. 1.25 and 12.85) and study
the FUNE-G1 associated with each value of b1. To each value of b1 is associated (at
most) one FUNE-G1. Finally, we assume that the intensity of the externality is such
that  = 1 in equation (1).
It is easy to see that the presence of a welfare-maximizing faction increases aggregate
welfare in the following limited sense. The rst order condition for rm 1 in a FUNE-G1
equilibrium can be expressed as
a1
1
r11 + 1  a1   b1
R1
r1R1 =  b1
W   Wr1W; (14)
where
r1W =

@W
@p1
;
@W
@q1

,
while r11 and r1R1 are given by (4). So, contrary to the 2 faction case studied in
section 3, there exists a direction in the price-quality space that would simultaneously
increase prots and revenue in rm 1 (since the LHS of (14) is typically not equal to
zero) but the welfare-maximizing faction prevents the other two factions from moving
into this direction. In other words, removing the welfare-maximizing faction (or simply
decreasing its bargaining weight) at any FUNE-G1 with b1>0 would result in the other
two factions in rm 1 moving in a direction that would decrease aggregate welfare.
This argument is purely local and limited, because it falls short of taking into account
the reaction of the other rm to the deviation by rm 1 as b1 decreases. In order to
assess the full impact of modifying b1, we have to compute the FUNE-G1 associated to
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each value of b1,14 and compare the welfare level attained in each equilibrium. As b1
increases15, we have that
 the quality o¤ered by both rms increases monotonically and moves closer to the
optimal qualities: q1 increases from 48.4 to 128.8 as b1 increases (the optimal value
of q1 is 220) while q2 increases from 40.5 to 86.7 (while the optimal value of q2 is
103.6);
 the proportion of people buying the low quality good increases with b1 (from 37.5%
to 64.5%) and moves closer to the optimal proportion, 85.8%;
 the e¢ ciency of the FUNE-G1 increases monotonically, from 56% to 94% (see
Figure 2).
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
We summarize all this in the next Result:
Result 3 As the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizing faction in the high qual-
ity rm increases, the e¢ ciency of the corresponding FUNE-G1 allocation increases
monotonically, with the qualities of both goods increasing and moving closer to their
optimal levels, while the proportion of people buying the low quality good increases and
also moves closer to its optimal level.
We thus obtain not only that the government taking a participation (by which we
mean introducing a third faction bent on maximizing welfare) in the high quality rm
helps increasing the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation, but also that e¢ ciency
is monotonically increasing in the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizers. All
these regularities also hold true for the other two eFUNES (denoted by eFUNEvar1 and
14Finding FUNE-G1s requires solving 4 equations (rst order conditions with respect to price and
quality for statements (i) for rm 2and (ii) for rm 1in Denition 4) in 5 unknowns (p1; q1; p2; q2
and b1), given that we keep a2 and (1  a1  b1)=a1 constant at the level reached in the unique eFUNE:
We choose a value for b1 and solve for the other 4 unknowns. We also check that the second order
conditions are satised.
15We limit b1 to [0,3/4] because of convergence problems for b1>0.75.
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eFUNEvar2) that we have identied in section 4 by modifying the shape of either the
function () or Q(r). They also hold true if the government invests in the low quality
rm rather than in the high quality rm.
6 The impact of the externality intensity
In this section, we test the robustness of the results obtained in the previous section to
variations in the externality intensity (the value of parameter  in equation (1)). Recall
that the value of  does not impact the set of FUNEs without government intervention,
nor the eFUNE we selected. We thus start from the same eFUNE as in the previous
section. On the other hand,  impacts the e¢ ciency reached in this eFUNE, and also
the FUNE-G1 corresponding to any value of b1 (because  appears in the rst order
condition (14) with a welfare-maximizing faction).
We have proceeded in the same way as in the previous section, starting from the
eFUNE obtained in section 4 and maintaining constant the relative bargaining weights
of the prot and revenue-maximizing factions in both rms while we increase b1. Figure
3 reports by how much total surplus increases (compared to the original eFUNE without
welfare maximizers) as a function of the bargaining weight of welfare maximizers (b1)
for several values of the externality intensity . We obtain the following results:
 Whatever the value of b1 > 0, the gain in surplus is always positive and is larger
when the externality intensity  is bigger. Moreover, the marginal gain in surplus
(@W=@b1) weakly increases with the value of , for any value of b1:
 The surplus gain increases monotonically with b1 and converges to a horizontal
asymptote. The value of b1 above which welfare becomes quasi- horizontal in
Figure 3 is increasing in . In other words, pushing the bargaining weight of the
welfare maximizers above a certain threshold brings nearly no additional increase
in aggregate welfare.
 Whatever the value of  2 [0; 1], the quality of both goods and the market share
of the low quality good increase with b1. The high quality level and the fraction of
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people consuming the low quality good are always lower than their optimal level.
As for the low quality level, it is lower than its optimal level, except when  is
low (  1=2) and b1 large i.e., in the case where  is low, the lowest quality
level is driven above its optimal value as the welfare-maximizers bargaining power
increases.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
We summarize in the following Result:
Result 4 Governments participation in the high quality rm is more desirable (i.e.,
increases more total surplus) when the externality intensity is larger. The marginal gain
in welfare (when the bargaining weight of the governmental faction increases) rises with
the externality intensity (for given b1) but decreases with the bargaining weight of the
welfare maximizing faction (for given ), and converges to zero. Raising b1 increases
both quality levels and the proportion of people buying the low quality good. The low
quality level overshoots its optimal level when the externality intensity is low enough
(  1=2) and when the bargaining power of the welfare maximizers is large enough.
It is not surprising that governments intervention is more desirable (both in absolute
terms and at the margin) when the externality intensity is large, since the FUNEs
without government intervention perform particularly badly (large under-provision of
quality by both rms) in this case. It is also quite intuitive that the marginal increase in
welfare (when b1 is increased) is lower when the government faction is already powerful
inside the rm. Interestingly, a powerful welfare-maximizing faction in rm 1 may
induce an over-supply of quality in the low quality rm (when the externality intensity
is low enough).
We now put these welfare gains in perspective by looking at how the e¢ ciency of any
FUNE-G1 equilibrium (measured as previously as the ratio of the equilibrium welfare to
the maximum, Pareto e¢ cient, welfare), evolves with the welfare maximizersbargaining
weight b1 for several values of  (see Figure 4).
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[Insert Figure 4 around here]
We obtain the following results:
 When the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizers b1 is close to zero, e¢ ciency
is decreasing with the externality intensity : the more people care for the average
good quality, the less e¢ cient the laissez faireFUNE allocation.
 The ranking is reversed for su¢ ciently high values of b1: the e¢ ciency of FUNE-G1
with powerful welfare-maximizers increases when people care more for the average
good quality.
 Whatever the value of the externality intensity, the government taking a partici-
pation in the high quality rm never allows to reach the Pareto e¢ cient allocation.
The gain in surplus from this participation, measured as a proportion of the max-
imum attainable surplus rather than in absolute terms as in Figure 3, increases
with the externality intensity.
We summarize in the following Result:
Result 5 The gain in e¢ ciency (measured as the ratio of equilibrium to maximum
attainable welfare) when the government takes a participation in the high quality rm
increases with the externality intensity. If the bargaining weight of the welfare maxi-
mizers is low, the e¢ ciency of FUNEs decreases with the externality intensity, while
it increases if b1 is large enough. Neither partial nor total nationalization of the high
quality rm allows to attain the Pareto e¢ cient surplus level.
The regularities summarized in Results 4 and 5 also hold true when one takes as a
starting point either the allocation eFUNEvar1 or eFUNEvar2 rather than eFUNE0, and
when the government invests in rm 2 rather than in rm 1.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have looked at competition between two rms providing di¤erentiated
goods when individuals may care for the average quality of the goods supplied and
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when rms are composed of various factions whose objectives di¤er. As such, this
analysis belongs to the mixed oligopoly literature, which studies competition between
rms whose objectives di¤er. Our main assumptions are that rms are composed of
both prot and revenue maximizers, and that these two factions bargain with each
other when choosing price and quality of the good their rm is o¤ering. An equilibrium
allocation, called Firm Unanimity Nash Equilibrium (FUNE), corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium between rms when factions inside each rm bargain e¢ ciently.
Using numerical simulations, we rst show that there is a two-dimensional manifold
of FUNEs, each characterized by the relative bargaining weight of the revenue maximiz-
ers in each rm. The normative properties of FUNEs are bad, with qualities provided
being too low and too many consumers buying the high quality good. We then open
the bargaining power black box and provide an explanation as to how their values
are determined. Providing such an explanation has an obvious interest by itself, and
also allows us to narrow down the set of equilibria and indeed to obtain unicity. Our
next step is then to introduce public intervention in the form of the government taking
a participation in one rm. We assume that participation introduces a third faction
in this rm, whose objective is to maximize total surplus. We obtain that e¢ ciency is
monotonically increasing with the bargaining weight of the welfare maximizing faction,
although the marginal gain in welfare tends to zero as the bargaining weight becomes
large enough. A larger value of the externality intensity also makes governments inter-
vention more desirable, since it increases both the marginal and absolute gain in welfare
from this intervention. We obtain the same qualitative results whether the government
invests in the high-quality or the low-quality rm.
The approach used in this paper could be extended in several directions. First, we
concentrate on one form of government intervention, namely the introduction of welfare-
maximizers in one rms board of directors. It would be interesting to contrast this with
other, more light handed, forms of regulations such as price caps for instance. Second, we
have assumed that the government faction maximizes welfare. It might be interesting
to allow for other objectives for the faction appointed by the government, even with
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a benevolent government.16 Third, we have abstracted from many shortcomings of
the government taking a participation in one rm, like incentive issues or nancial
expenditures associated with this policy when the cost of public fund is large. We have
done this in order to focus on whether there is a case to be made for such a public
intervention in the most favorable setting. Introducing incentive issues would obviously
restrict the set of parameters for which taking a participation in a rm is desirable.
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Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1
Equate the right hand sides of the rst order conditions for rm 1 (equations (5)
and (6)):
1  F ()  [p1   c(q1)] f()@@p1
F ()  1 + p1f()@@p1
=
 c0(q1) (1  F ())  [p1   c(q1)] f()@@q1
p1f(
)@

@q1
:
Manipulating this equation reduces it to
c(q1)
q1   q2
 = c0(q1)

p1
q1   q2  
1  F ()
f()

: (15)
Proceeding in like manner for rm 2, we obtain
 c(q2)
q1   q2
 = c0(q2)

F ()
f()
  p2
q1   q2

: (16)
Using the fact that
c(q)
c0(q)
=
q
r
;
and dividing equation (15) by c0(q1) and equation (16) by c0(q2); and then adding the
equations gives

r
=  +
2F ()  1
f()
:
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Figure 1 : FUNEs in the HPrice, QualityL space
600 700 800 900 1000 1100
Price
40
45
50
55
Quality
Figure 2 : Efficiency of FUNE − G1 as a function of b1 when γ = 1
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Figure 3 : Increases in surplus as a function of b1 for several values of γ
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Figure 4 : Efficiency as a function of b1 for several values of γ
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